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When Tying One On Shouldn't Tie Up the Courts:
A Toast to the Adoption of a Comparative
Negligence Standard in Dramshop Actions
Instigated By or On the Behalf of the Drunk
Driver
I. "HEY BARTENDER, GIMME ONE MORE FOR THE ROAD."
Did you know that in the past decade, four times as many Amer-
icans died in drunk driving accidents as were killed in the Vietnam
War?' In 1990 alone, almost 400,000 persons were killed or injured
in alcohol-related traffic accidents.' Traffic accidents are the great-
est single cause of death for persons between the ages of five (5)
and thirty-two (32). Tragically, almost one-half of these accidents
are alcohol-related.3 According to the current estimates, about two
(2) in every five (5) Americans will be involved in an alcohol-re-
lated accident at some time in their lives. 4 These statistics graphi-
cally illustrate the current crisis which has engulfed the American
people.
People, however, are responding. Vocal private citizens groups,5
dedicated to decreasing these tragedies, have educated the popula-
tion and influenced the government. In response, legislative and
judicial bodies have enacted statutes and developed common law
designed to impose civil and criminal liability upon the people who
cause such accidents and to compensate their victims. Indeed, over
thirty-five states have adopted, either by statute or common law,
some form of liability against dramshops6 who negligently serve al-
l. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, "Alcohol Involvement in Fatal
Crashes - 1990" National Technical Information Service (July 1991) ("NHTSA") in
Mothers Against Drunk Driving, A 1991 Summary of Statistics: The Impaired Driving
Problem, 1,3 (September 1991) ("MADD"). For a copy of the MADD pamphlet, call or write
to MADD, PO Box 541688, Dallas, Texas 75354-1688, (214) 744-MADD, Fax (214) 869-
2206/2207.
2. MADD at 1.
3. Id at 3.
4. Id at 1.
5. Examples of such groups include Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD) and
Students Against Drunk Driving (SADD).
6. A dramshop is a colloquial term for a tavern, bar or other drinking establishment.
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cohol.7 Likewise, a few states have adopted the social host doctrine
which creates liability against non-vendors who negligently serve
alcohol."
Pennsylvania is listed among the states which have adopted both
dramshop and social host liability doctrines in an effort to ensure
safety on its highways.e These laws also promote responsible alco-
hol consumption. However, there is a defect in the Pennsylvania
judiciary's current approach to dramshop actions which seriously
undermines the goal of decreasing alcohol-related accidents. Al-
though Pennsylvania recognizes actions against dramshops that
negligently serve alcohol, Pennsylvania does not hold persons who
become intoxicated and then injure themselves partially accounta-
ble for their negligence in drinking to the point of intoxication or
for their unreasonable decision to drive while under the influence
of alcohol. Thus, the current law gives tacit approval to alcohol
consumers to overindulge and then attempt to drive. This com-
ment addresses the incompatibility of the judiciary's continued re-
fusal to permit the dramshop defendant to assert the liquor con-
sumer's comparative negligence 0  under Pennsylvania's
Comparative Negligence Act" with the legislative goal of promot-
Dramshop Acts refer to statutes prohibiting any liquor licensee, including a beer distributor,
from serving alcohol to certain groups of patrons. Black's Law Dictionary 494 (West, 6th ed
1990).
7. These states include Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut,
Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Min-
nesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New
York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Da-
kota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Daphne D. Sipes, The
Emergence of Civil Liability for Dispensing Alcohol: A Comparative Study, 8 Rev Litiga-
tion 1, Appendix B (1988).
8. New Jersey is often cited as the first state to adopt this theory. Rappaport v
Nichols, 31 NJ 188, 156 A2d 1 (1959). This doctrine, as adopted in Pennsylvania, will be
discussed in section IIB of this comment.
9. Dramshop liability results from a violation of 47 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 4-493 et seq
(Purdon & Supp 1991). Social host liability is limited to the negligent service of alcohol to
those under the legal age of consumption. See generally Congini v Portersville Valve Co, 504
Pa 157, 470 A2d 515 (1983).
10. This comment focuses only on the contributory negligence of the individual as it
relates to alcohol consumption and the subsequent operation of an automobile. This com-
ment does not state a position on whether other conduct should be deemed negligent.
11. 42 Pa Cons Stat § 7102 (Purdon 1991) provides:
(a) GENERAL RULE - In all actions brought to recover damages for negligence resulting
in death or injury to person or property, the fact that the plaintiff may have been
guilty of contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery by the plaintiff or his legal
representative where such negligence was not greater than the causal negligence of
the defendant or defendants against whom recovery is sought, but any damages sus-
tained by the plaintiff shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence
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ing safety on our highways through responsible alcohol
consumption.
II. THE CURRENT STANDARD IN PENNSYLVANIA
A. The Dramshop Liability Doctrine (Liquor licensees)
By statute, 2 Pennsylvania prohibits dramshops from furnishing
any type of alcohol to a visibly intoxicated person, an insane per-
son, a minor, 3 a habitual drunkard or a person of known intem-
perate habits. Service of alcohol to a person who is a part of this
protected class is a criminal offense and may lead to the revocation
of the vendor's liquor license.' 4 These statutes have also been in-
terpreted as setting the standard of care in civil actions against the
dramshop.' 5 As applied in these civil actions, the Pennsylvania
courts have held that a violation of these criminal statutes is negli-
gence per se' and, if the violation is a found to be a proximate
cause of the plaintiff's injury, the defendant will be held liable.
7
The Pennsylvania judiciary has placed sole responsibility for
such harm upon the dramshop. This fact is evidenced by the Penn-
sylvania courts' consistent refusal to permit the dramshop to assert
the defense of comparative negligence against the patron. 8 Section
483 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts has generally been used
attributed to the plaintiff.
42 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 7102.
12. 47 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 4-493 et seq.
13. The legal drinking age in Pennsylvania is twenty-one. 18 Pa Cons. Stat Ann §9
6307, 6308 (Purdon 1983). The age of majority in Pennsylvania is eighteen. PaRCP No 76,
42 Pa Cons Stat Ann (Purdon 1987). The legislature's failure to clearly define the word
"minor" in the dramhop statute as a person under twenty-one has led to a great amount of
litigation involving the issue of whether a person between the ages of eighteen and twenty-
one is a minor under this statute. 18 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 6310.1 (Purdon Supp 1991) was
recently enacted and specifically prohibits the selling or furnishing of liquor or malt bever-
ages to those under twenty-one. The legislature should be applauded for appropriately clari-
fying the protected class rather than using the ambiguous term "minor".
14. 47 Pa Cons Stat Ann §4-493 et seq.
15. See Majors v Brodhead Hotel, 416 Pa 265, 205 A2d 873 (1965) (Patron who
jumped or fell from a hotel window ledge could recover for his injuries from the hotel that
served him alcohol while he was visibly intoxicated).
16. Black's Law Dictionary defines negligence per se as "Conduct, whether of action
or omission, which may be declared and treated as negligence without any argument or
proof as to the particular surrounding circumstances, either because it is a violation of a
specific statute or valid municipal ordinance." Black's Law Dictionary at 1035 (cited in note
6).
17. Majors, 205 A2d at 875-76.
18. Id at 876.
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to justify the imposition of liability solely upon the dramshop.1l
This section was first adopted by the Pennsylvania courts in dram-
shop actions in 1958, prior to the adoption of the Comparative
Negligence Act.20 The thrust of this section is that the plaintiff's
contributory negligence does not bar his or her recovery for the
defendant's negligence in violating a statute if the statute was
designed to impose sole responsibility for the resulting harm upon
the defendant."1
Only one recent Pennsylvania decision, Barrie v Pennsylvania
Liquor Control Board,22 has held that comparative negligence
under the Comparative Negligence Act may be asserted against a
person falling within the protected class of liquor consumers. In
that case, three underage friends drank a half gallon of vodka and
part of a fifth of gin during the course of an evening. 23 The alcohol
was illegally purchased by a twenty year old from a state-run li-
quor store.2 ' The threesome held their party outdoors near a
creek" and Bryan Barrie, who was then sixteen years old,
wandered away from the drinking party while he was intoxicated. 6
His body was later recovered from the creek.27 The cause of death
was drowning and acute alcohol poisoning.28
Bryan's mother brought a wrongful death and survivor action
against the alcohol-purchaser and the Pennsylvania Liquor Control
Board, the agency which ran the liquor store.2 9 The district court
allowed the Liquor Control Board ("LCB") to assert the compara-
tive negligence of Bryan in consuming alcohol while underage. 30
19. Section 483 provides:
DEFENSE TO VIOLATION OF STATUTE -
The plaintiff's contributory negligence bars his recovery for the negligence of the de-
fendant consisting of the violation of a statute, unless the effect of the statute is to
place the entire responsibility for such harm as has occurred upon the defendant.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 483 (1965).
20. See Schelin v Goldberg, 188 Pa Super 341, 146 A2d 648, 652 (1958). The use of
section 483 was affirmed in Corcoran v McNeal, 400 Pa 14, 161 A2d 367, 371 (1960).
21. See Corcoran v McNeal, 400 Pa 14, 161 A2d 367 (1960); Schelin v Goldberg, 188
Pa Super 341, 146 A2d 648 (1958); Neal v Sunset Grove Inc., 1 Pa D & C 4th 294 (1988).
22. 5 D & C 4th 174 (Allegheny County 1990), aff'd 137 Pa Commw 514, 586 A2d
1017 (1991).
23. Barrie, 5 D & C 4th at 175.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id at 176.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See note 54.
30. Barrie, 5 Pa D & C 4th at 179. Specifically, the court stated that Bryan Barrie,
Vol. 31:525
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The court cited two rationales to support this new position. First,
the court observed that all of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
cases that prohibited this defense had been decided when a finding
of contributory negligence would absolutely bar a plaintiff's recov-
ery." However, it noted that under Pennsylvania's Comparative
Negligence Act, a plaintiff's comparative negligence will not bar re-
covery, but will only reduce it in proportion to the plaintiff's rela-
tive fault."2 Second, the court cited Congini v Portersville Valve
Co.33 and Matthews v Konieczny,,3 both of which imposed liability
on the defendants under the doctrine of social host liability,3 5 as
two cases decided after the Comparative Negligence Act was
passed that allowed the liquor server to assert the imbiber's com-
parative negligence in order to reduce the plaintiff's recovery. e
The court determined that although these cases dealt specifically
with social host liability, their reasoning on this issue was equally
applicable in dramshop actions.3 "
The commonwealth court approved of the district court's ratio-
nales and affirmed the decision.38 However, the commonwealth
court further found that the LCB was not a liquor licensee.39 In
this respect, the commonwealth court distinguished actions
brought against the LCB from actions against taverns which are
considered liquor licensees.'0 Therefore, to date, no appellate court
has specifically addressed the issue of whether a dramshop may
use the comparative negligence defense under the Comparative
Negligence Act.
B. The Social Host Liability Doctrine
A social host may be defined as a person who serves alcohol
without a license. For example, any person who hosts a party
then age sixteen, violated 18 Pa Cons Stat § 6308 which prohibits those under twenty-one
from consuming alcohol. Id.
31. Id at 178.
32. Only if the jury determines that the plaintiffs negligence was greater than that of
the defendant will the entire recovery be barred. Id. See also notes 70-73 and accompanying
text.
33. 504 Pa 157, 470 A2d 515 (1983).
34. 515 Pa 106, 527 A2d 508 (1987).
35. This doctrine and its application will be discussed in part II B.
36. Barrie, 5 Pa D & C 4th at 180-81.
37. Id.
38. Barrie v Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board, 137 Pa Commw 514, 586 A2d 1017,
1021 (1991).
39. Barrie, 586 A2d at 1020.
40. Id.
1993
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where alcohol is provided may be considered a social host for the
purposes of this doctrine. In 1983, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court, in the landmark case of Congini v Portersville Valve Co.,
41
held that a non-licensee "social host" could be liable for the negli-
gent service of alcohol to a minor.42 In that case, an eighteen year
old minor had been injured when he rear-ended another vehicle
while on his way home from his employer's Christmas party where
he had been served alcohol.43 In reaching its conclusion, the court
based its decision upon a negligence per se analysis. Rather than
using the dramshop statute," the court found that the employer,
as a social host, could face civil liability as an accomplice 45 to the
minor's illegal consumption 46 of alcohol.47 The court found it sig-
nificant that, under the law, the minor should not have been con-
suming liquor and that he was able to do so only through the negli-
gence of his social host.48 In this manner, the court was able to
distinguish its past decisions which refused to impose this duty on
social hosts who serve persons over the legal drinking age of
twenty-one.4
9
It is important to note that in Congini the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court allowed the social host to assert the minor's compara-
tive negligence5" as a defense and thus reduced the recovery
41. 504 Pa 157, 470 A2d 515 (1983).
42. For a more extensive treatment of the cases applying the social host liability doc-
trine, See Recent Decisions, Alumni Association v Sullivan, 29 Duquesne L Rev 357 (1991).
43. Congini, 470 A2d at 516.
44. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court had previously determined that the Pennsylva-
nia criminal dramshop statute only applied to liquor licensees. Manning v Andy, 454 Pa
237, 310 A2d 75, 77 (1973).
45. 18 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 306(c)(1)(ii) (Purdon 1983) provides:
(c) ACCOMPLICE DEFINED - A person is an accomplice of another person in the com-
mission of an offense if:
(1) with the intent of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense,
he:
(ii) aids or agrees or attempts to aid such other person in planning or
committing it;
18 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 306(c)(1)(ii).
46. 18 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 6308(a) (Purdon Supp 1992) provides:
(A) OFFENSE DEFINED - A person commits a summary offense if he, being less than 21
years of age, attempts to purchase, purchases, consumes, possesses or knowingly and
intentionally transports any liquor or malt or brewed beverage, as defined in section
6310.6 (relating to definitions).
18 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 6308(a).
47. Congini, 470 A2d at 517.
48. Id at 517-518.
49. Id at 517 citing Klein v Raysinger, 504 Pa 141, 470 A2d 501 (1983).
50. The benefits of the comparative negligence standard as it has been applied in
530
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awarded to the plaintiff.5" In its opinion, the court stated that mi-
nors over the age of fourteen are presumptively capable of negli-
gence.52 Thus, when the plaintiff is over fourteen, the jury must
apportion the negligence between the plaintiff and the defendant.
This apportionment effects the amount of recovery to which the
plaintiff is entitled.
The social host doctrine has not been limited to non-licensees. In
Matthews v Konieczny,5s the Pennsylvania Supreme Court used
the social host doctrine to impose liability against a beer distribu-
tor 4 whose service of alcohol to a minor resulted in an injury to a
third party.55 In doing so, the social host doctrine was expanded to
include licensees and to provide recovery to third persons injured
by the minor.5 6 Interestingly, because this action was brought
under the social host doctrine and not the liquor code, the court
would permit the beer distributor to establish the comparative
negligence of the plaintiff.
57
In summary, the Pennsylvania judiciary has used both the dram-
shop statute and the social host doctrine to impose liability upon a
other jurisdictions will be discussed in section III B of this comment.
51. Congini, 470 A2d at 577.
52. Id citing Kuhns v Brugger, 390 Pa 331, 135 A2d 395 (1957). The Kuhns holding
became commonly known as the "rule of sevens": a minor under the age of seven is conclu-
sively presumed incapable of negligence; minors between the ages of seven and fourteen are
rebuttably presumed incapable of negligence, and such presumption grows weaker with each
year until fourteen; minors over fourteen are presumed capable of negligence. Kuhns, 135
A2d at 401.
53. 515 Pa 106, 527 A2d 508 (1987).
54. Pennsylvania is unique in that liquor is not sold in grocery stores or gas stations.
Rather, beer is sold by state-licensed beer distributors and all other liquor is sold in state-
run liquor stores.
55. Matthews, 527 A2d at 514. This was a consolidated action involving two incidents
where a commercial vendor sold alcohol to a minor who later injured a third party. In the
first action, a beer distributor sold beer to a seventeen year old who later shared it with five
of his friends. Id at 510. The friends consumed the alcohol while driving and, at some point,
the driver lost control of the car and struck a tree, killing one passenger. Id. In the second
action, a beer distributor sold a case of beer to a twenty year old who shared it with the
defendant. Id. The defendant lost control.of the car he was operating, struck the plaintiff's
car and caused her injuries. Id.
56. Id at 512. It is doubtful that the court wanted to use this doctrine. However, 42
Pa Cons Stat § 4-497 exempts a licensee from liability to third persons injured by the licen-
see's customers while away from the licensed premises unless it. can be shown that the cus-
tomer was served while visibly intoxicated. Thus, in order to reach this result, the court was
forced to either extend the social host doctrine to the licensee or interpret the statute so as
to allow recovery under these facts. In fact, the court did both, but its expansion of the
social host doctrine provided the more convincing argument and thus became the holding in
the case.
57. Matthews, 527 A2d at 512.
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dramshop for the negligent service of alcohol to a member of the
protected class. However, the dramshop may plead the liquor con-
sumer's comparative negligence as an affirmative defense only in
actions based upon the social host doctrine; it may not assert this
defense in actions based upon the criminal dramshop statute. Be-
cause this defense is allowed in some dramshop actions, it cannot
be said that the courts are attempting to hold the dramshops to a
higher standard. Likewise, no meaningful distinction can be made
between intoxicated persons who were served by the social host
and those served alcohol by a dramshop.
In truth, this inconsistency is created by the plaintiffs' attorneys
and is used to benefit the plaintiffs at the expense of the dram-
shops and the general public. The inconsistency is significant be-
cause the plaintiff's attorney, familiar with the applicable case law,
would presumably prefer to sue under the dramshop act because of
the inability of the dramshop defendant to reduce the damages
through the assertion of the plaintiff's comparative negligence. An
intelligent attorney would also prefer to sue under the dramshop
statute when the attorney knew that the plaintiff had been con-
suming alcohol prior to the injury because evidence of that con-
sumption would not be considered relevant. By giving the plaintiff
the option to use the theory which prohibits possibly damaging ev-
idence and increases his or her probability of a higher reward, the
judiciary's response is not consistent with the legislature's desire to
promote safety on our highways by increasing responsible alcohol
consumption.
III. THE RESPONSE IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
The jurisdictions that prohibit or limit the recovery awarded to
the liquor consumer are divided into two camps: those which have
adopted the doctrine of complicity and those which have adopted
the doctrine of comparative negligence under a comparative negli-
gence statute.
A. The Complicity Doctrine In Dramshop Actions
A generally accepted definition of the complicity doctrine is that
"one who actively contributes to or procures the intoxication of the
inebriate is precluded from recovery." 8 The complicity doctrine is
58. Nelson v Araiza, 69 Ill2d 534, 372 NE2d 637, 641 (1977). It is normally a question
of fact as to whether the plaintiff's conduct satisfies this definition and thus bars his or her
recovery. Nelson, 372 NE2d at 637. This case was remanded so that the trial court could
Vol. 31:525
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generally used by those states that have enacted civil dramshop
statutes which specifically provide a civil cause of action to anyone
who is injured by an intoxicated patron. In many states these
statutes enumerate who may recover. Such definitions may specifi-
cally exclude the intoxicated person.a However, when the statu-
tory language does not clearly exclude the liquor consumer, the
court will use the complicity doctrine to deny the intoxicated con-
sumer's recovery. Courts have adopted this doctrine in an attempt
to further the legislative policy of increasing responsible liquor
consumption. These courts have stated that to provide recovery in
these instances would "undermine the purpose of the [civil dram-
shop statutes] in controlling [the] abuses of the liquor trade." 61
Thus, under the complicity doctrine, the liquor consumer cannot
recover damages from the dramshop for his or her own injuries.
62
As one state court observed, "to allow monetary recovery to one
who knowingly becomes intoxicated and thereby injures himself
would be morally indefensible inasmuch as the state would effec-
tively be encouraging excessive liquor consumption."6 3 Nor have
the courts made any distinction between visibly intoxicated adults
and illegally-served minors." Rather, the courts have held that the
statutory language of the civil dramshop statutes excludes any li-
quor consumer from the scope of the statute's protection regard-
less of age. 5
The doctrine of complicity has also been used to prohibit recov-
determine whether the plaintiff, who participated in an all-night drinking binge with the
intoxicated person, actively contributed to his intoxication when she did not buy the alco-
hol, but merely acquiesced in his purchases and in allowing him to subsequently drive her
home. Id at 638.
59. See Ill Ann Stat ch 43 §§ 6-21 (Smith-Hurd 1989), Mich Stat Ann § 18.993 (Cal-
laghan Supp 1989), Minn Stat Ann § 340A.801 (West Supp 1990)
60. See Craig v Larson, 432 Mich 346, 439 NW2d 899, 900 (1989). The Michigan
statute, for example, provides a cause of action to a "wife, husband, child, parent, guardian
or other person injured ... by a visibly intoxicated person .. " Craig, 439 NW2d at 900.
The court in Craig interpreted this statute to exclude the intoxicated person from the scope
of the statutory protection. Id.
61. Nelson, 372 NE2d at 639.
62. The statutory language generally provides for recovery only to those injured by
the liquor consumer. See note 60.
63. Allen v County of Westchester, 109 AD2d 475, 492 NYS2d 772, 774 (1985)(To
allow plaintiff-wife to recover for husband's death, which resulted from a fall while he was
intoxicated, would bestow benefits for wrongful conduct in contravention of public policy).
64. Craig, 439 NW2d at 901. In this case, a twenty year old could not recover under
Michigan's civil dramshop statute for injuries he sustained as a passenger in a car driven by
an intoxicated nineteen year old when the plaintiff paid for a number of beers consumed by
the intoxicated driver throughout the evening. Id at 900.
65. Id at 901-02.
1993
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ery to drinking companions who are injured by the intoxicated per-
son." Again, the underlying rationale is that these persons are ex-
cluded from statutory protection because of their active role in
contributing to the liquor consumer's intoxication."7
In the cases which use the complicity doctrine, the courts inquire
into the voluntary role the plaintiffs played in their own or an-
other's intoxication. The focus is, therefore, on the plaintiffs' con-
duct before the injury occurred. If their contribution to the intoxi-
cation is found to be substantial, recovery is denied. Factors which
the courts look for in respect to this element include whether the
purchase or service of the intoxicating liquor was made by the
plaintiff.68 These courts distinguish this issue from the issue of
whether the plaintiff played any role in sustaining the actual in-
jury. 9 The latter issue is the focus of those cases applying compar-
ative negligence principles. In those jurisdictions, the focus may be
on conduct which occurred before and during the injury.
B. The Comparative Negligence Doctrine in Dramshop Actions
Today, a majority of the states have adopted, either by statute
or by common law, a comparative negligence standard. 0 Compara-
tive negligence, as contrasted to contributory negligence, does not
automatically bar recovery.7 1 Instead, the comparative negligence
66. See generally Comment, Dramshop Liability: The Blurry Status of Drinking
Companions, 34 SLU L Rev 1153 (1990). This comment provides a comprehensive overview
of the complicity doctrine as it applies to drinking companions.
67. Herrly v Muzik, 374 NW2d 275 (Minn 1985). The Minnesota Supreme Court held
that a passenger who sued the three taverns that sold the passenger and the driver liquor
was barred under the complicity doctrine due to the active role the passenger played in
purchasing the alcohol that the driver consumed. Herrly, 374 NW2d at 278-79.
68. Nelson, 372 NE2d at 640.
69. Id.
70. Thirty-two states, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands have now enacted compara-
tive negligence statutes: Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho,
Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Ne-
braska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Virgin Islands,
Wisconsin and Wyoming. See Note, Comparative Negligence and Dramshop Laws: Does
Buckley v Pirolo Sound Last Call for Holding New Jersey Liquor Vendors Liable for the
Torts of Intoxicated Persons, 62 Notre Dame L Rev 238 n 34 (1987).
Ten states have adopted comparative negligence through the common law: Alaska, Cali-
fornia, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Michigan, Montana, New Mexico and West Vir-
ginia. Note, 62 Notre Dame L Rev at 238 n 34.
Seven states have not adopted comparative negligence: Alabama, Georgia, Maryland,
North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee and Virginia. Id.
71. Comparative Negligence Act, 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 7102 (Purdon 1991)(See
note 11 for the text of this statute).
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of the plaintiff and defendant are considered when apportioning
damages. 2 The doctrine of comparative negligence has the benefit
of compensating victims while still making individuals responsible
for their own safety.7 s Consequently, the comparative negligence
doctrine appears to be a more realistic approximation of the extent
that individuals in society should be responsible for their. own
safety and for the safety of the persons around them.
The supreme courts of six states have adopted and approved of
this method of apportioning damages in civil dramshop actions.
7 4
One court of appeals has also adopted this standard.73 In all of
these cases, the plaintiff or cross-claimant was either the liquor
consumer who caused the accident or the drinking companion. As
with the complicity doctrine, the courts applying the comparative
negligence standard have made no distinctions between visibly in-
toxicated adults and illegally-served minors.7 Instead, the courts'
focus when applying comparative negligence is on the reasonable-
ness of the plaintiff's actions as they relate to alcohol consumption.
In analyzing the plaintiffs' conduct, these courts have not hesi-
tated to find that the intoxicated persons, like the dramshops that
served them, were negligent per se.7 7 Underage plaintiffs have been
most commonly found negligent per se because of their violation of
statutes prohibiting the purchase and consumption of alcohol while
under twenty-one .7  Driving while intoxicated, in violation of a
state's motor vehicle code, has also been considered negligent per
72. 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 7102.
73. Note, 62 Notre Dame L Rev at 254.
74. Tome v Berea Pewter Mug Inc., 4 Ohio App3d 98, 446 NE2d 848 (1982) (court
would reduce plaintiff's recovery in proportion to his negligence in consuming alcohol while
underage); Young v Caravan Corp., 99 Wash2d 655, 663 P2d 834 (1983) (plaintiff's son was
negligent per se as a matter of law in his consumption of alcohol); Purchase v Meyer, 108
Wash2d 220, 737 P2d 661 (1987) (court may consider plaintiff's negligence in consuming
alcohol while underage); Brannigan v Raybuck, 136 Ariz 511290 3, 667 P2d 213 (1983) (un-
derage plaintiff's consumption of beer and tequila prior to the accident is relevant to the
reduction of damages); Baxter v Noce, 107 NM 48, 752 P2d 240 (1988) (statutory cause of
action for gross negligence in service of alcohol allowed, subject to comparative negligence);
Buckley v Pirolo, 101 NJ 68, 500 A2d 703 (1985) (comparative negligence of passengers
could be asserted in a dramshop action brought after December 6, 1982); Lyons v Nasby,
770 P2d 1250 (Colo 1989) (the Colorado Supreme Court permitted a mother's wrongful
death action, based on common law negligence per se, subject to the tavern's assertion of
her son's comparative negligence in drinking to the point of intoxication).
75. Danielson v Johnson, 366 NW2d 309 (Minn App 1985).
76. Purchase, 737 P2d at 666.
77. Tome, 446 NE2d at 853.
78. See Tome, 446 NE2d at 853; Purchase, 737 P2d at 661; Danielson, 366 NW2d at
312-13 and Young, 663 P2d at 837-38.
1993
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se for both minor and adult plaintiffs.7" Some of the plaintiffs in
these jurisdictions had argued that comparative negligence could
not be asserted against them because the criminal dramshop stat-
utes were designed to place the sole responsibility upon the dram-
shop. 0 These courts, however, unlike their Pennsylvania counter-
parts, determined that the legislature, by making criminal the
plaintiff's behavior, had clearly indicated that they did not intend
dramshops to assume sole responsibility for drunk driving
accidents."'
IV. ANALYSIS
The ever-increasing number of states that have adopted either
dramshop or social host liability has demonstrated the country's
growing awareness that alcohol-related accidents are a serious
problem which need to be addressed. These states have addressed
this crisis by imposing criminal and civil penalties upon persons or
businesses who negligently serve or consume alcohol. This response
was designed to further three underlying public policies. First, the
civil dramshop statutes were designed to decrease irresponsible li-
quor service by a tavern or other liquor licensee. Second, the stat-
utes prohibiting alcohol consumption before a specified age were
created to decrease under-age drinking. Finally, the statutes and
common law were designed to increase safety on the highways by
decreasing drunk driving accidents.
States, such as New Jersey, that pioneered this movement were
among the first to realize that in order to further these public poli-
cies, legal coercion would have to be applied to both the liquor
supplier and the liquor consumer.8 2 New Jersey recently codified
the New Jersey Licensed Alcoholic Beverage Server Fair Liability
Act 83 which has been declared the exclusive remedy for all dram-
79. Tome, 446 NE2d at 853; McGovern v Koza's Bar & Grill, 254 NJ Super 723, 604
A2d 226 (1991) (plaintiff who was injured when the car she was driving while intoxicated
struck two parked cars will have her recovery reduced in proportion to her comparative
negligence under the New Jersey Licensed Alcoholic Beverage Server Fair Liability Act, NJ
Stat Ann 2A:22A-1 et seq (West 1987)).
80. Tome, 446 NE2d at 853.
81. Id.
82. New Jersey Licensed Alcohol Beverage Server Fair Liability Act, NJ Stat Ann
2A:22A-1 et seq; McGovern v Koza's Bar & Grill, 254 NJ Super 723, 604 A2d 226, 228
(1991); Lee v Kiko Restaurant, 127 NJ 170, 603 A2d 503, 509 (1992). The Lee court con-
cluded that the jury should consider the patron's conduct in drinking to the point of intoxi-
cation in apportioning fault between patron and tavern which served patron after he became
visibly intoxicated. Lee, 603 A2d at 510.
83. NJ Stat Ann 2A:22A-1 et seq.
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shop actions in New Jersey.84 This act specifically requires its
state's comparative negligence act be applied to all actions brought
under this act.s" By doing so, the New Jersey legislature has re-
moved all doubt from the New Jersey judiciary's mind that there
must be a "balanced and reasonable procedure for allocating re-
sponsibility for such losses" among the tavern and the liquor
consumer.
86
Thus far, Pennsylvania has created criminal and civil penalties
against the dramshop but has only created criminal penalties
against the liquor consumers who injure themselves.8 s  In suits
against the dramshop, no distinction has been made between a
plaintiff who was in fact the liquor consumer and a plaintiff who
was injured by the liquor consumer. The inappropriateness of this
similar treatment can be illustrated by the fact that the liquor con-
sumers, unlike the innocent bystanders, had at least two opportu-
nities to prevent their injuries. First, the liquor consumers could
have consumed a moderate amount of alcohol so as not to become
intoxicated. Second, if the liquor consumers had drank too much,
they could have made the responsible decision not to drive. The
innocent bystanders, on the other hand, had no such opportunities.
They only had the dubious distinction of being in the wrong place
at the wrong time.
It is reasonable to conclude that the judiciaries' similar treat-
ment of two dissimilar groups amounts to a tacit approval of irre-
sponsible liquor consumption. Moreover, it fails to address the so-
cial irresponsibility displayed by liquor consumers in attempting to
operate a car while in an intoxicated condition. Without addressing
the social responsibility the liquor consumers play in their own in-
juries, the Pennsylvania courts will continue to hinder, rather than
assist, the furthering of the legislative public policies created to de-
crease alcohol-related tragedies.
The current analysis used by Pennsylvania courts is marred by
the now-inappropriate reference to section 483 of the Restatement
84. NJ Stat Ann 2A:22A-4.
85. McGovern, 604 A2d at 228 citing NJ Stat Ann 2A:22A-5 which requires New
Jersey's Comparative Negligence Act, NJ Stat Ann 2A-15-1 et seq (West 1987 & Supp
1992), to be applied to actions brought under the act.
86. McGovern, 604 A2d at 228 citing the legislative findings of the Act, which were
codified at NJ Stat Ann 2A:22A-2, in order to conclude that in New Jersey the comparative
negligence of a third party and the patron will be an affirmative defense for the tavern.
McGovern, 604 A2d at 228.
87. See notes 12-57 and accompanying text.
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(Second) of Torts. 8 The courts adopted this standard prior to the
enactment of Pennsylvania's Comparative Negligence Act.89 At
that time, the assertion of the plaintiff's contributory negligence
would have completely barred recovery and would have not have
had any coercive effect upon the dramshop. Thus, it is understand-
able that the courts adopted this section as the law of Pennsylva-
nia. However, through the doctrine of stare decisis, 90 section 483
continues to impact the law of Pennsylvania even after the justifi-
cation for it has long since past. Under the Pennsylvania Compara-
tive Negligence Act,"l the plaintiff's contributory negligence will
not bar recovery.9 2 Rather, the recovery will be reduced in propor-
tion to the amount of negligence which the jury attributes to the
plaintiff.93 Only if the jury determines that the plaintiff's negli-
gence exceeded that of the defendant will recovery be denied.9"
The second rationale used by the courts to disallow the use of
the comparative negligence standard was that the legislature had
determined that the sole responsibility for such harm was to be
placed upon the tavern. However, section 483 should be applied
only when it is clear that the legislature desires to place the entire
liability burden upon the defendant. The Pennsylvania legislature
has recently enacted yet another criminal statute designed to de-
crease the consumption of alcohol by minors.' 5 From this action it
appears that the legislature has made yet another attempt to fur-
ther the state's policy of decreasing underage drinking and the
driving accidents which are caused by it. It is arguable, therefore,
that the legislature, in increasing the criminal penalties imposed
for the illegal purchase or consumption of alcohol by minors, 6 has
indicated its desire to place some responsibility for illegal con-
88. See note 19 for text of this section.
89. See note -11 for the text of Pennsylvania's Comparative Negligence Act.
90. Stare decisis is the policy of the courts to stand by precedents and not to disturb
a settled point of law. However, there are times when the courts will overrule previous
precedents. This occurs when the court finds that the precedents are based on an erroneous
rule of law. Black's Law Dictionary at 1406 (cited in note 6).




95. 18 Pa Cons Stat Ann §§ 6310.1-6310.6 (Purdon & Supp 1990). This statute makes
it a misdemeanor for a person to intentionally and knowingly furnish alcohol to a person
less than 21 years of age and also increases the penalties imposed upon the consuming mi-
nor. 18 Pa Cons Stat Ann §§ 6310.1-6310.6.
96. Underage persons who violate 18 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 6308 (Purdon 1991), relat-
ing to the illegal purchase or consumption of alcohol, now will have their driver's licenses
restricted and will face a $500.00 fine for each subsequent violation.
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sumption upon the consumers themselves. Thus, it should no
longer be said that the legislature clearly desires to place the entire
responsibility upon the dramshops themselves.9 7 Absent this clear
legislative mandate, the courts should abandon the use of section
483 in dramshop actions.
The Pennsylvania courts should instead look to the Restatement
(Second) of Torts section 469 for guidance.9 8 Section 469 provides
that the plaintiff can also be negligent per se for the violation of a
statute designed for his or her own protection. Thus, under this
section, minors and visibly intoxicated persons who injure them-
selves would have to answer, at least in part under the Compara-
tive Negligence Act, for their own negligence. By adopting such a
rule, both the dramshops and the negligent consumers will be ef-
fectively and legally coerced into reevaluating the desirability of
similar negligent actions in the future.
Moreover, the use of section 469 is a balanced approach to the
problem. Neither the complicity doctrine nor Pennsylvania's cur-
rent approach adequately places civil responsibility upon both par-
ties. As was noted above, Pennsylvania's current policy places the
entire responsibility upon the defendant dramshop while the states
which use the complicity doctrine completely bar the plaintiff's ac-
tion and remove any responsibility from the defendant dramshop.
The extreme nature of these two positions surely cannot be as ef-
fective as the use of comparative negligence which will impose lia-
bility upon the dramshop, but reduce the plaintiffs' recovery to the
extent that they were responsible for their own inebriated condi-
tion or subsequent decision to drive while intoxicated.
IV. CONCLUSION
Pennsylvania attempts to further two public policies when it
controls liquor distribution and consumption. The Commonwealth
first seeks to decrease irresponsible and life threatening behavior
97. See generally Tome v Berea Pewter Mug Inc., 4 Ohio App3d 98, 446 NE2d
848,853 (1982).
98. This section provides:
Violation of Legislation or Regulation-
(1) The plaintiff's unexcused violation of a legislative enactment or an administrative
regulation which defines a standard of conduct for his own protection is contributory
negligence in itself if it is a legally contributing cause of his harm.
(2) The rules which determine whether such an enactment or regulation defines a
standard of conduct for the protection of the plaintiff, and when the violation will be
excused, are the same as those applicable to the defendant.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 469 (1965).
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by alcohol providers and consumers. Such control furthers Penn-
sylvania's second public policy of increasing safety on state high-
ways. To implement these policies, legislation was enacted and ju-
dicial doctrines were developed. However, the inconsistent
application of the comparative negligence defense in actions
against dramshops has hindered, rather than furthered, these poli-
cies. Successful implementation of these important and life-saving
policies will be achieved only by consistently recognizing the dram-
shop's right to assert the liquor consumer's comparative negligence
in sustaining his or her own injuries under Pennsylvania's Compar-
ative Negligence Act.
The current Pennsylvania Supreme Court holdings do not ade-
quately address this specific issue. Likewise, the commonwealth
court's decision in Barrie only partially achieves these goals be-
cause of its apparent limited application to the Pennsylvania Li-
quor Control Board. Therefore, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
must determine whether the legislative goal of decreasing the trag-
edies associated with drunk driving will be achieved by permitting
the dramshop to assert the liquor consumer's comparative negli-
gence regardless of the theory that is asserted against the dram-
shop. Only when the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has served its
final mandate will the lower courts be able to sound last call to
judicial decisions which, like the intoxicated drivers they favor, en-
danger the public safety.
Karen Yvette Bonvalot
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